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1. Introduction 
Risk is commonly thought of as related to the chance of suffering a loss. In the following 
discussion we formally define risk and show that epidemiology and risk assessment are 
related to the probability that a specified event occurs. The risk will be in the form of a relative 
risk where the probability of an event occurring under specified conditions is expressed as a 
multiplier for the probability of the event occurring at some defined 'background level.' 
The goal of the paper is to determine if there is a smallest relative risk that can be 
determined. That is, is there a risk level at which we can say 'An estimated risk less than X 
cannot be considered different from background level no matter what estimation methods 
are used or what the estimated statistical significance level is.'   We are assuming the 
estimated risk level is based on data from an epidemiological study such as the health 
effects of ambient air pollution or arsenic in the public drinking water. We assume that there 
is a True Risk Level that applies to a defined population and we wish to estimate it based on 
the data from an epidemiology study. We assume the data are statistically analyzed either by 
simple ratios of the observed data or by model-based Bayesian or Classical statistical methods. 
There are specific epidemiological and statistical considerations that are needed to develop the 
formal estimate of the true risk as diagramed in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 indicates the flow is from a true, but unknown, risk to a final estimate of the risk. It 
could have been shown as a flow from the initial hypothesis, through the design of the 
experiment, the analysis of the data, and the final estimate of the true risk. Either structure 
can be used, but we have chosen the method shown in Figure 1. 
In practice the statistical and epidemiological considerations are not separate and distinct 
steps in the estimation process, but are shown and discussed separately for convenience. 
The following sections will cover: 
 Basic Conclusions,  
 Meaning of relative risk (RR),  
 Epidemiological considerations in estimating a RR,  
 Statistical considerations in estimating a RR,  
 Discussion of how to answer the question   “what is the smallest relative risk that can be 
determined”?  
 Conclusion and summary, 
 An appendix of quotes from knowledgeable researchers in the field   
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  Considerations:  
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Fig. 1. Considerations needed to develop the point estimate and the significance level of an 
estimated risk. 
2. Basic conclusions 
There is no minimum estimable risk in the sense that there is no minimum measure of 
length. To accurately and precisely measure risk, or length, one needs a tool that is accurate 
and precise enough for the measurement being made. For example, a meterstick is 
inadequate for measuring length to a precision of 0.1 mm. When measuring risk in 
epidemiology, precision and accuracy depend on many factors including the degree to 
which the experimental data and analysis are free of the errors associated with experimental 
design flaws (i.e. confounding, bias, reliability, measurement error and misclassification, 
potential alternate risk factors), and statistical analysis errors (i.e. sampling error, violations 
of model assumptions, model shopping, multiple subgroup analyses, reliance on 
significance levels or p-values). Indeed, it is theoretically possible to correctly estimate 
significant risks near 1.000001 if there were no confounding, no biases, no measurement 
error, exact model specifications, etc. But it is unlikely, if not impossible, these conditions 
ever exist for an epidemiology study. 
While there is no ‘lower bound’ to an estimable risk, and while many experienced researchers 
have made opinions about approximate lower bounds, a practical lower limit does exist. To 
believe an estimated risk the researchers must demonstrate that they have carefully considered 
the array of possible errors that can arise from the tools and techniques used. As important as 
these demonstrations are, the difficulty of actually performing these demonstrations leaves 
many questions about the ‘true risk,’and at some point the demonstration may become 
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infeasible or meaningless and leave the realm of conventional science. As exposures approach 
background levels and apparent risks approach 1.0, the estimates enter the realm of ‘trans-
science.’When a problem is in the area of trans-science, risk assessment tools of standard 
science are, by definition, not useful. The most useful outcome possible may be the 
understanding that the problem belongs to the area of trans-science. 
Epidemiology has provided society with many benefits by providing clues to the causes of 
infectious diseases and identifying factors that contribute to the start and development of non-
communicable diseases. Causal knowledge allows quick and effective preventive measures to 
lessen or halt the diseases without a full understanding of the underlying mechanism. As the 
RR to be estimated becomes smaller the need for the analyses to be free of errors becomes 
greater and at some point it becomes impossible to reduce the error further.  
3. Meaning of Relative Risk 
We will consider epidemiologically based risk as measured by the relative risk (RR). By 
definition, RR is the ratio of disease frequency in exposed individuals divided by the disease 
frequency in unexposed individuals (or controls). RR can be thought of as the multiplier of 
the probability of an event occurring in a special situation relative to the probability of the 
event occurring in a baseline situation. For example, if the probability of developing lung 
cancer among smokers was 15% and among non-smokers was 3%, then the relative risk of 
cancer associated with smoking would be 5. Smokers would be five times as likely as non-
smokers to develop lung cancer 
Related to the concept of a RR is the idea of Association. Association is measured by 
absolute differences in rates of disease and by ratios of disease frequency. 
 The difference measure of association is the absolute difference in disease frequency 
between exposed and unexposed. It is an estimate, in the absence of bias, of the absolute 
amount of disease caused by or attributable to exposure. This absolute difference is 
proportional to the prevalence of exposure, and so is not especially useful in assessing 
causality 
 The ratio measure is the ratio of disease frequency between exposed and unexposed. It 
is an estimate of the proportional increase or excess of disease in exposed relative to 
unexposed and is unaffected by prevalence of exposure. The ratio measure of an 
association is used when determining whether there is a plausible evidence for a causal 
association between exposure and disease, or the etiology of disease. The evidence for a 
causal association is strengthened when there is a strong association, or when the 
relative risk (RR) is high. The larger the RR the greater the likelihood that an association 
is causal. Associations may be misleading, because other factors can cause apparent, but 
spurious, associations that are not true associations. The larger the RR the more unlikely 
it is that unrelated factors (e.g., bias, confounding) could overcome a true association. 
However, a RR cannot be used as the sole proof of causality.  
The RR is derived from study designs where the study population is selected on the basis of 
exposure (e.g. cohort study), or disease (e.g. case-control design) and may have different 
names depending on the context:  
 In a cohort mortality study the RR is called a standardized mortality ratio (SMR).  
 In a cohort incidence study the RR is called a standardized incidence ratio (SIR).  
 In a morbidity cohort or cross-sectional study the RR may be called a prevalence ratio. 
 In a case-control study the RR is called an odds ratio (OR).  
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In a case-control study design the study population is selected on the basis of disease, and 
the strength of association is based on the odds of exposure (odds ratio or OR), which is the 
ratio of the proportion of exposed among cases divided by the proportion of exposed among 
non-cases. The OR is based on the assumption that the disease is rare. [There are methods 
for estimating risk ratios and confidence intervals from adjusted odds ratios (Greenland 
2004, and King and Zeng, 2010).]  In everyday applications the OR is used in a way similar 
to a RR for assessing causality. Differences include the fact that the risk is for exposure, not 
disease, as in the cohort-based RR. And there are usually differences in some of the 
confounders. For example, recall bias is likely to be a problem in a case-control study 
because cases are more likely than non-cases to remember more or exaggerate exposures 
related to their disease. This is not a likely confounder in a cohort study since the exposure 
data should be collected blind to disease status. 
A weak association means the proportional excess of disease in the exposed relative to 
unexposed (RR) is small in magnitude, or less than about 2-fold. As associations becomes 
increasingly weak the importance of spurious factors (e.g., confounding, bias) increases until 
a point is reached where they overcome (become larger) than the effect of interest. Or in 
other words, as the power of the signal decreases it will eventually be unintelligible when it 
is overwhelmed by the noise level in the system.  
In epidemiology practice 'weak' and 'strong' relate only to ratio associations and not to the 
difference measure of association (Rothman and Poole 1988). The strength of association for 
a particular agent varies over time because the estimated effect depends on the "time-
specific distribution of its causal complements in the population" (Rothman and Greenland 
2005), which varies over time and between populations.     
Strength of association is a major guideline in determining causality (Hill 1965). But there is 
no agreed upon value for an association to be considered weak or strong. A less than two-
fold increased risk has been generally accepted as a ‘weak’ association. For example, in 
litigation the court accepts a causal association if the connection between exposure and 
disease is ‘more likely than not.’   In epidemiology an etiological fraction or attributable risk 
(AR) can be calculated to estimate what proportion of a disease is attributable to exposure to 
a risk factor when that risk factor is believed to be a cause of the disease. The formula for 
this calculation expressed as a percent (x 100) is: 
 
1
100
RR
AR
RR
   (1) 
If the RR for a risk factor of interest = 2.0, then 50% of the disease is attributed to that risk 
factor. Therefore RR must be greater than 2.0 for the exposure to ‘have more likely than not’ 
caused the disease in a particular individual. 
4. Epidimiological considerations 
In this section we consider areas dealing with study design, confounding, biases, 
measurement error, misclassification, reliability, and the effects of multiple risk factors. 
Epidemiology is an observational, not an experimental science. Because humans are the 
study subjects it is not possible to manipulate or control exposure. Exposure often consists 
of the exposures experienced at work, as in occupational epidemiology. The investigators 
(and the study subjects) lack the capability of producing a specific intensity of exposure. The 
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duration and intensity of exposure cannot be controlled, and only the population can be 
defined. So there is a distribution of exposures of different intensity and duration among the 
study population. This is in contrast to the experimental design of animal studies where a 
desired exposure intensity and duration are produced for a selected number of animals 
selected at random from the same population.  
In epidemiology, estimates of uncertainty are limited by real world limitations. The 
investigator in an industrial exposure study can increase the size of the study population by 
including more work sites (or cases with disease), but the total size of the study population 
is often limited.The investigator has no control regarding intensity and duration of 
exposures in the workplace, and exposures are generally not to a pure substance but to a 
mixture of different chemicals that varies over time. Also the investigator has no control on 
the presence of potential lifestyle confounders (e.g., smoking, obesity, alcohol, age, sex). It is 
possible to statistically account for confounders, but adjustments will be incomplete because 
a) the risk associated with each confounder is an imprecise estimate; and b) because there 
are some unknown confounders for which no statistical adjustment is possible. Note that we 
use the term ‘account for confounders’ or ‘adjust for confounders’ instead of the more 
popular ‘correct for confounders’ because an additional term in a statistical model can not 
correct for the presence of confounders, but can only apply a term that might account for the 
confounder if the adjustment term is adequate. 
All estimates of associations in epidemiology are uncertain because of "unknown levels of 
systematic error from measurement, uncorrected confounding, selection bias, and other biases" 
that "may even dwarf the random sampling error" (Phillips 2003). The significance of random 
sampling error is estimated via p-values or confidence intervals. But statistical uncertainty tells 
us nothing about hidden uncertainties with regard to bias and confounding.  
Measurement error is a major problem in evaluating causality in epidemiology. Rothman 
and Greenland (2005) argue that measurement error includes all errors, which range from 
statistical error to uncertainty problems relating to study design (such as subject selection 
and retention) through uncontrolled confounding and all other forms of bias. The “true 
risk“is unknown and is always an estimate because every study has some type of error. "The 
real issue is to quantify the errors. As there is no precise cutoff with respect to how much 
error can be tolerated before a study must be considered invalid, there is no alternative to 
the quantification of study errors to the extent possible."   Whether or not one is assessing 
causality via a set of guidelines such as those of Hill, (Hill, 1965) one must estimate the "total 
error that afflicts the study" to obtain a reliable estimate of risk. This part of the project 
further defines and explains this goal of quantifying study errors but excludes consideration 
of statistical errors.  
What are the guidelines for estimating reliability? A minimally reliable RR must be the same 
order of magnitude or greater than the maximum risks from unknown confounding and 
bias. The magnitude of the unknown confounding should be less than the minimum known 
confounding, assuming the investigator is rigorous in the design of the study.  
Taking statistical significance into account, guidelines for reliability of a RR are outlined in 
Table 1. 
4.1 Minimal reliable RR 
There are several points that define a minimal reliable RR (MRRR). 
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 Confounding 
Observational 
Study Results 
Experimental 
(clinical) 
Study Results 
Statistically 
significant 
NOT controlled Unreliable Unreliable 
Controlled Possible Real Effect 
More likely Real 
Effect 
Not statistically 
Significant; 
RR > Minimal RR from 
hidden uncertainties 
 
NOT 
Controlled 
More Unreliable More Unreliable 
Controlled 
Possible Real Effect; 
Not significant 
because of small n? 
Unreliable 
 
Not Statistically 
Significant; 
RR < minimal RR from 
hidden uncertainties 
NOT controlled 
Very Unreliable-
likely no relation 
Very likely no 
association 
Controlled 
Likely No 
association 
Very likely no 
association 
Table 1. Guidelines for Reliability of a RR  
4.1.1 Point 1: There is no single number for a minimal reliable risk that pertains to all 
studies 
The strength of association and magnitude of the uncertainty (and therefore the MRRR) can 
vary from study to study because of the influence from several sources such as: study 
population, the causal components of the disease, the frequency and magnitude of the 
biases, measurement error, etc. MRRR is not dependent on sample size, and is therefore 
independent of statistical uncertainty or the p-value.  
As an example of this point, Maldonado et al. (2003) conducted sensitivity analyses on four 
studies investigating relationships between occupational exposures to glycol ether and 
congenital malformations. They specifically examined methodological errors that produced 
biased results that could have incorrectly increased RRs from 24% to 300%. Unfortunately, 
“without information that can be used to judge the plausibility of different error-producing 
scenarios, we cannot know the true impact of error on study results….currently available 
evidence does not refute the [alternative hypothesis] conjecture that elevated OR estimates 
are due to error.”   (Maldonado, et al. 2003) 
Study Example 1: (Cordier, Bergeret et al. 1997) 
This is a case-control study of glycol ether and congenital malformations with multiple 
positive associations that were substantively modified by adjustments for potential biases. 
They reported 
  Overall OR = 1.4 (1.1-1.9) for all malformations combined. 
  Elevated ORs ranging from 1.3 to 2.0 for all eight major categories of malformations 
  Elevated ORs ranging from 1.2 to 2.6 for 17/18 subcategories of malformations  
  Most likely causal association was for cleft lip with an OR of 2.51 and monotonic E-R 
trend with ORs of 1.0, 1.5, 2.2, and 2.9 with increasing exposures from no to certain 
exposure. 
These results were consistent with previous studies showing similar associations. Are these 
risks greater than a MRRR? Are the risks strong enough to support a causal association and 
greater than hidden uncertainties such as bias? Sensitivity analyses address these questions. 
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 Potential selection bias from unreported abortion rates differing between exposed and 
controls could produce errors estimated to range from 0.85 to 1.17. A 3% difference was 
calculated to produce a spurious OR of about 1.1.  
 Potential selection bias from case non-response may have produced error factors 
ranging from 0.68 to 1.61. If 50% of identified cases were not included in the study the 
error factor was calculated to be 1.03.  
 Potential selection bias may occur if controls are selected differently than cases and are 
from different populations, as was the case in this study. They suggest the error factor 
might range from 0.50 to 2.0, and the original authors needed to assess effects of this bias. 
 Potential information bias due to exposure measurement error was inadequately 
presented so the magnitude of the error factor could not be reliably estimated. 
Maldonado et al. (2003) suggested information bias might produce error factors ranging 
from 1.4 to 2.3 for exposure misclassification effects related to cleft lip.  
 Potential biases in combination are estimated by multiplication of the error factors, 
which in this case was an error factor of 2.47 (= 1.1 x 1.03 x1.09 x 2). With crude ORs of 
2.51 (for cleft lip) and an error factor of 2.47, the corrected OR is 2.51/2.47, or 1.02. 
Cordier et al. (1997) adjusted for other biases and estimated an error factor of 1.24 
(which changed the crude OR of 2.51 to 2.03). Combining the error factors of 
Maldonado et al. (2003) and Cordier et al. (1997) (2.47 x 1.24 = 3.06) changes the original 
crude OR of 2.51 to an adjusted OR of 0.82.  
Similar sensitivity analyses of three reproductive studies are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Types of Bias (Cordier, Bergeret et 
al. 1997) Error Factor 
(Shaw, Velie et al. 
1999) Error Factor 
(Cordier, Szabova et 
al. 2001) Error Factor 
Due to losses 1.1 0.91 1.03 
Case non-response 1.03 0.89 0.96 
Non-random 
Control selection 
2.0 0.50 2.0 
Exposure 
measurement error 
1.09 0.63 1.83 
Subtotal of 
scenarios 
2.46 0.26 3.62 
Confounding Largely unknown Largely unknown Largely unknown 
Author 
adjustments 
1.24 None None 
EF: Bias in 
combination 
2.46 x 1.24 =3.06 0.26 3.62 
Adjusted ORs 2.50 / 3.06  0.82 0.93 / 0.26 3.58 3.4 / 3.62  0.94 
 
Table 2. Summary of potential error factors (EF) due to bias and confounding in three 
studies of occupational exposure to glycol ethers and congenital malformations. Based on 
plausible scenarios (Maldonado, Delzell et al. 2003)    
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These combined biases are quite large and indicate a MRRR in these studies is far from 1.0. 
Reproductive studies of this type tend to have large error factors, and the minimal 
interpretable RRs for these 3 studies should be at least >3, <0.2 and > 3.6 before assessing 
associations of glycol ether and congenital malformations in these studies. Maldonado, et al. 
(2003) indicate that because there is a lack of investigation and information available to 
estimate the extent of the biases, results of these studies are basically uninterpretable.  
4.1.2 Point 2: If the estimated RR is smaller than the estimated bias of one of the 
confounders, then the estimated RR is not reliable and there is a low probability that a 
causal association exists  
Or in more general terms, if the estimated uncertainty or noise is greater than the estimated 
RR a causal association is unlikely and undetectable.  
This is the situation for the results outlined in Table 2, which are based on scenarios whose 
plausibility is basically unknown. Until the extent of the biases is measured with more 
reliability, determination of a causal association will remain speculative because of the large 
size of the potential biases in both positive and negative directions.  
There are several examples of studies where the strength of the associations is quite low and 
the question has arisen as to whether it is possible to measure such associations. These 
include dozens of studies examining associations between ambient concentrations of air 
pollutants (especially PM) and acute mortality and morbidity. These are mostly time-series 
studies where daily concentrations of pollutants in a city are correlated with the daily 
number of some health effect such as deaths, hospitalizations or asthma cases. Associations 
in these studies are quite weak with relative risks often around the null value of 1.0. For 
example, associations with mortality range from negative (<1.0) to a high of about 1.05. That 
is, the statistical model suggests that as PM concentrations increase by some amount (e.g.10 
µg/m3) there is 5% increase in mortality or morbidity. For a RR of 0.95 the model suggests a 
decrease in disease of 5% for every unit increase in exposure. 
The primary known confounders in these studies are weather and co-pollutants. Can 
adequate adjustments be made of these confounders?  Are the effects of these confounders 
greater than the effect of the pollutant of interest? If the answers are no and yes to each 
question respectively, it is probable the results are spurious and the PM effect cannot be 
distinguished from the confounding effect.  
Lumley and Sheppard (Lumley and Sheppard,  2000) assessed the magnitude of biases in a 
time-series study of asthma admissions and ambient PM concentrations in Seattle, WA. In the 
original study the estimated RR was 1.03 per 10 µg/m3 increase in PM. They then changed the 
exposure data (PM concentrations) to different time periods so no association would be 
expected (RR = 1.0). Deficits or increases in RRs under these conditions would indicate the 
magnitude of uncontrolled bias. Exposure data from 1 and 2 years in the future produced 
negligible bias. Exposure data 3 and 4 years in the future produced RRs larger than effect 
estimates from the real data. The authors concluded “the bias is small in absolute terms but of 
the same order as the estimated health impacts.”   Results from these types of studies where 
RRs are on the order of 1.03 may be measurements of bias not of effects. If so, the observed RR 
is spurious and can produce an incorrect and misleading interpretation.  
The HEI Health Effects Committee (2003) reviewed a selected number of time-series studies 
after it was discovered that there were errors in the calculation of risk ratios and confidence 
intervals in these air pollution studies. They indicated there is no satisfactory way to adjust 
for weather and other time-varying confounders such as co-pollutants (HEI 2003).They 
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concluded “no strictly data-based (i.e., statistical) method can exist to insure that the amount 
of residual confounding due to that variable is small. This means that no matter what 
statistical method one uses…it is always logically possible that even if the true effect of 
pollution is null, the estimated effect is far from null due to confounding bias.”   Because the 
associations are so weak in these studies the effects that are being attributed to air pollution 
may “actually be due to…other factors, including weather (typically temperature and 
relative humidity), as well as unmeasured factors that also vary with time.”     
The Lumley and Sheppard paper suggests a minimal RR for a causal association in time-
series studies must be greater than about 1.05 or the RR said to be associated with air 
pollution may, in actuality, be produced by unmeasured factors. A RR <1.05 should be 
considered too weak an association to interpret in the context of time-series air pollution 
studies, no matter how significant the p-value. And the RR may need to be even greater than 
that since there is no objective method to adjust for confounding from weather or time-
related factors. Since weather may have a larger effect on health than PM we may be in an 
untenable situation with risk factors (e.g., weather, co-pollutants) having potentially greater 
effects than the exposure of interest.  
Exposure misclassification is another unresolved problem in time-series studies. All cases in 
a time-series study are considered exposed to the same concentration of pollution in the 
ambient air. Ambient ozone does not permeate into homes, so cases may have 1% or less 
actual exposure than measured ozone exposure, and minimal estimated risk may be much 
higher than 1.05. The effect of this exposure misclassification error in this type of study 
should be studied and adjusted for.  
4.1.3 Point 3: There are two kinds of uncertainty associated with relative risks and 
confounding: Known risk called RR (kc) and unknown risk called RR (uc)  
Epidemiology is an observational science so there is natural variation or background 
uncertainty inherent in every study. Sometimes some of the effects of this uncertainty can be 
estimated. For example, a heavy smoker is at about a 20-fold greater risk of lung cancer than 
a non-smoker.  
Issues of hidden uncertainty (e.g., bias, confounding) may be more important than 
frequentist statistical significance (Sterne and Smith 2001; Phillips 2003) and are important 
concerns that must be considered when evaluating   possible etiological agents.  
Statistical inferences (e.g., p-values) are based on the assumption that the statistical model is 
correct. However, statistical models can never account for all factors. Incompletely accounted 
for factors are subsumed under the general rubric of bias and confounding. If these factors 
are not accounted for in comparisons between exposed and non-exposed populations, 
results may be rendered invalid or unreliable.  
Confounding occurs when effects of two agents are not separated and they are counted as 
one effect. As a result, a difference in disease rates is not due to the exposure of interest 
alone, but is due to effects of exposure plus other factors such as smoking, diet, etc. By 
definition a confounder must (1) cause the disease (or be associated with a causal risk 
factor); (2) be correlated with exposure, either positively or negatively; and (3) not be 
affected by the exposure. 
Confounding arises due to a lack of comparability between exposed and unexposed groups. 
If both exposed and non-exposed are all non-smokers, smoking cannot be a confounder 
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because smoking is not associated with exposure and exposed/unexposed groups are 
comparable with respect to the prevalence of smoking. Confounding is an issue that must 
always be addressed in assessing issues of causality (McNamee 2003).  
Strictly speaking there will always be differences between exposed and unexposed groups, 
but sometimes the differences are small and unimportant. What is important is the 
magnitude and direction of confounding effects on the estimated relative risk. The degree of 
confounding is measured as the ratio of the measured confounded RR divided by the true 
unconfounded RR. For a single dichotomous confounder, the degree of confounding 
depends on 1) the strength of the association between confounder and disease (RR); and 2) 
the percentage (p) of subjects in the exposed (p1) and unexposed (p0) groups. It is calculated 
from the formula:   
 1 1
0 0
(100 )
(100 )
confounded RR p RR p
true RR p RR p
   

  (2) 
For example, a confounded RR will be 1.4 times the true RR if the strength of association for 
the confounder is 5 and the prevalence of the confounder in exposed and unexposed 
populations are 50% and 30% respectively. The statistical significance between p1 and p0 
should not be used to assess the potential importance of confounding. If there were 40 
subjects in each group in this example, the difference between 50 and 30% is not significant 
at the 5% level. But a 1.4-fold difference between confounded and true RR is important. 
Table 3 illustrates the degree of confounding that can occur for a strength of association = 5 
(McNamee 2003). 
 
Unexposed Exposed Group: prevalence of confounder (p1) 
p0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
10%  1.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 
20% 0.8  1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.6 
30% 0.6 0.8  1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 
40% 0.5 0.7 0.8  1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 
50% 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9  1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 
60% 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9  1.1 1.2 1.4 
70% 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1.1 1.2 
80% 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1.1 
90% 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9  
Table 3. Degree of confounding due to differences in prevalence between exposed and 
unexposed when the true risk=5 
The degree of confounding is affected more by differences in prevalence of a confounding 
factor than by strength of the associations, especially above RRs of 5 or so. For example, at 
prevalences of 60 vs. 40% in exposed and unexposed, the degree of confounding at RR of 2, 
5, 10, 15, and 20 are 1.14, 1.31, 1.39, 1.42, and 1.44 respectively.  
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4.1.4 Point 4: Reliance on p-values is an ill-founded strategy. The veracity of a 
research finding is not dependent on a p-value and vice-versa 
Too commonly results are considered conclusive on the basis of a p-value less than 0.05. This 
is an ‘ill-founded strategy’ because of the high rate of non-replication (lack of confirmation) 
from a “single study assessed by formal statistical significance’ (Ioannidis 2005).Others have 
made the same point (Sterne and Davey Smith 2001; Wacholder, Chanock, et al. 2004). The 
probability that a finding is actually true when based simply on achieving statistical 
significance is called the positive predictive value, PPV (Ioannidis 2005). The formula for 
calculating PPV is  
  PPV (Positive Predicted Value) = (1-┚)R / ((1-┚)R + ┙) (3) 
where  
┚ = Type II error rate, usually 0.20 
┙ = Type I error rate, usually 0.05 
R = ratio of the number of ‘true relationships’ to ‘no relationships’ among tested hypotheses.  
That is, the higher the PPV the greater the chance the estimated RR is an accurate estimate of 
the true risk. If was assume ┚ = 0.20, ┙ = 0.05, and R=1.0 (half the hypotheses that were 
tested were found to be statistically significant), the probability of a statistically significant 
RR being true is estimated to be 0.89. If R = 0.06 (as when 3 of 53 of the hypotheses being 
tested was statistically significant), then PPV < 0.5 and chances are better than even that the 
results are not true. 
But bias and repeated independent testing by different investigators may further reduce the 
probability of a true (replicable) result. One definition of bias is ‘the combination of various 
design, data, analysis and presentation factors that tend to produce research findings when 
they should not be produced’ (Ioannidis 2005). This definition is analogous to publication 
bias in situ (PBIS) (Phillips 2004). It can involve manipulation of the analysis and cherry 
picking of the reported results. In the presence of this kind of bias the probability of a true 
finding is further reduced and can be estimated from the formula  
 PPV = ([1-┚] R + u┚R) / (([1-┚] R + [1-┙]u + ┙ + u┚R) (4)  
where u = the proportion of probed analyses that would not have been “research findings” 
but nevertheless end up presented and reported as such.’    
For example, in air pollution studies of PM thousands of models may be investigated, only a 
small percentage of which are reported. Assuming both R and u are 0.5 (not unusual in 
studies with many test models), there is less than a 50-50 chance that a finding is actually 
true (PPV = 0.46).  
On the basis of the above considerations, Ioannidis (2005) proposes several corollaries about 
the probability that a research finding is true or not.  
Corollary 1: The smaller the study, the less likely the findings are true. 
Sample size is related to power, and PPV ‘for a true research finding decreases as power 
decreases towards 1 – ┚ = 0.05.’    
Corollary 2: The smaller the RR (the weaker the association) the less likely the findings are 
to be true. 
Findings are more likely to be true for strong risk factors such as effects of smoking on 
cancer or cardiovascular disease (RR 3-20) than for small RRs such as genetic risk factors 
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for multi-genetic diseases (RR 1.1-1.5). Modern epidemiology increasingly targets smaller 
effect sizes as most risk factors with large RRs have been studied. As a result the 
proportion of true findings is expected to decrease. Similarly, if the majority of RRs are 
very small (e.g., RR < 1.05 as in genetic, nutritional and air pollution epidemiology), ‘this 
field is likely to be plagued by almost ubiquitous false positive claims…[and are] largely 
utopian endeavors.’ 
Corollary 3: ‘The greater the number and the lesser the selection of tested relationships’ the 
more likely the findings will be spurious.  
The higher the probability that the pre-study hypothesis is true, the more likely results of a 
study testing that hypothesis will be true and vice-versa. For example, meta-analyses and 
studies attempting to confirm hypotheses are more likely to produce true findings than 
hypothesis-generating studies. 
Corollary 4: Increased flexibility in design, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes 
increases the likelihood of spurious findings.  
Adherence to common standards and protocol is likely to decrease the probability of false 
findings. Flexibility (e.g., multifarious outcomes such as scales for schizophrenia; 
experimental analytical methods such as artificial intelligence methods; reporting only ‘best’ 
results) ‘increases the potential for transforming what would be “negative” results into 
“positive” results, i.e., bias, µ.’  But cherry-picking the data and manipulating outcomes and 
analyses reported remains a ‘common problem’ even within the most stringent research 
designs such as randomized trials (Chan, Hrobjartsson, et al. 2004).  
Corollary 5: ‘The greater the financial and other interests and prejudices…[of the 
investigator] the less likely the research findings are to be true.’ 
These factors increase bias and may be common and widespread. Examples cited included 
prejudice because of belief in a particular theory or commitment to their own previous 
findings; university-based studies conducted for no other reason than to increase 
qualifications for promotion or tenure; peer reviews written to suppress findings that refute 
the reviewer’s research findings. And there is evidence that expert opinion is ‘extremely 
unreliable’ (Antman, Lau et al. 1992). 
Corollary 6: ‘The hotter a scientific field (with more scientific teams involved), the less likely 
the research findings are to be true.’ 
For example in molecular genetics there is competition between laboratories to be the first to 
publish positive associations (e.g., race to describe DNA). This can lead to each lab pursuing 
and publishing their most impressive ‘positive’ results, or ‘negative’ results to contradict 
positive results from another lab. This is called the ‘Proteus phenomenon,’ where there are 
rapidly alternating findings followed by extremely opposite refutations (Ioannidis and 
Trikalinos 2005). 
Based on this reasoning, it is difficult to exceed a 50% probability that results are likely to be 
true. Considering effects of power, ratio of true to non-true relationships, and bias in various 
settings and study designs, Ioannidis (Ioannidis 2005) conducted simulations to estimate 
PPV. These are summarized in the Table 4. 
This analysis indicates the majority of modern biomedical research operates where the pre- 
and post-probability of true findings is very low. In a ‘null field’ where true positive 
associations are unlikely to occur (or where RRs are very low), one ‘would ideally expect all 
observed effect sizes to vary by chance around the null in the absence of bias. The extent 
that observed findings deviate from what is expected by chance alone would be simply a 
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pure measure of the prevailing bias.’ For example, suppose 60 nutrients had been examined 
for causing a specific cancer and RRs were in the range 1.2-1.4 comparing high to low 
exposed groups. ‘Then the claimed effect sizes are simply measuring nothing else but the 
net bias that has been involved in the generation of this scientific literature.’  
 
1-┚ R µ Practical Example PPV 
0.80 1:1 0.10 Adequately powered randomized control trial with little 
bias and 1:1 pre-study odds 
0.85 
0.95 2:1 0.30 Confirmatory meta-analysis of good quality randomized 
control trials 
0.85 
0.80 1:3 0.40 Meta-analysis of small inconclusive studies 0.41 
0.20 1:5 0.20 Underpowered, but well-performed phase I/II 
randomized control trials  
0.23 
0.20 1:5 0.80 Underpowered, poorly performed phase I/II randomized 
control trials 
0.17 
0.80 1:10 0.30 Adequately powered exploratory epidemiological study 0.20 
0.20 1:10 0.30 Underpowered exploratory epidemiological study 0.12 
0.20 1:1000 0.80 Discovery-oriented exploratory research with massive testing  0.0010 
0.20 1:1000 0.20 As in previous example, but with more limited bias (more 
standardized) 
0.0015 
Table 4. Positive predictive Value (PPV) of research findings for various combinations of 
power (1-┚), ratio of true to not-true relationships (R), and bias (µ) (Ioannidis 2005) 
4.1.5 Point 5: Multiple exposures are a special case of confounding. Research studies 
investigating a single exposure in observational studies can lead to biased estimates 
of risk because there is no accounting for exposure to other risk factors that are 
always present 
Exposure measurement errors and confounding are problem areas when studying effects of 
exposure to multiple chemical agents, and become more difficult when exposure to physical, 
biological, and psychological stressors are considered. In many epidemiology studies, 
exposure is limited to one, or at most two, agents in any analysis even though in most 
situations humans are exposed to chemical mixtures instead of a single chemical (Feron et 
al., 2002) as well as a wide variety of other stressors. Biological considerations have shown 
that exposure to some mixtures of chemical compounds can result in lower toxicity 
(antagonism) or higher toxicity (synergism) than expected based on knowledge of the 
potency of the individual components (Calabrese, 1991). There are many examples of these 
antagonistic and synergistic interactions in the literature (Chang et al., 2005).  
A classic description of a set of confounders occurs when there are several risk factors, each 
of which engenders the same response as the agent under analysis and whose magnitudes 
co-vary. Confounding effects can be accounted for if it is known that these risk factors are 
present in the environment and their interaction patterns are known. Since it is rare that the 
presence and interaction patterns are well known, observed risk may be an under- or over-
www.intechopen.com
 
Advanced Topics in Environmental Health and Air Pollution Case Studies 
 
16
estimate of the ‘true risk.” This problem is clearly exacerbated when the underlying risk is 
near unity. 
4.2 Summary of the epidemiologically based points 
It is difficult to account for all the pitfalls associated with designing an epidemiology study 
where potential risk is very low. The following quote (Ioannidis 2005) suggests the 
magnitude of the difficulties inherent in the air pollution field:  
‘For fields with very low PPV, the few true relationships would not distort this overall 
picture much. Even if a few relationships are true, the shape of the distribution of the 
observed effects would still yield a clear measure of the biases involved in the field. This 
concept totally reverses the way we view scientific results. Traditionally, investigators 
have viewed large and highly significant effects with excitement, as signs of important 
discoveries. Too large and too highly significant effects may actually be more likely to be 
signs of large bias in most fields of modern research. They could lead investigators to 
careful critical thinking about what might have gone wrong with their data, analyses, and 
results.’ 
Ioannidis (2005) suggest several steps be taken to improve post-study probability of 
reporting true findings and avoiding spurious interpretations: 
i. Look at the totality of the evidence. 
ii. Enhanced research standards and curtailment of prejudices may help. Part of this 
process is through ‘developing and adhering to a protocol’ in a fashion similar to that 
followed in randomized clinical trials. 
iii. Improve your ‘understanding of the range of R values-- the pre-study odds—where 
research efforts operate….[I]nvestigators should consider what they believe the chances 
are that they are testing a true rather than a non-true relationship.’    
iv. Don’t rely on significance as the primary basis for interpreting results. ‘[S]tatistical 
significance testing in the report of a single study gives only a partial picture, without 
knowing how much testing has been done outside the report and in the relevant field at 
large…[U]sually it is impossible to decipher how much data dredging…has preceded a 
reported research finding.’ 
5. Statistical considerations 
Statistical considerations are not independent or exclusive from epidemiological 
considerations. The distinction provides a possible separation between the strictly 
epidemiological steps of study planning and sample selection and the statistical steps of 
data analysis. Both areas come into play in the critical interpretation and reporting steps of 
the study. In this section we will concentrate mainly on the ideas of violation of model 
assumptions, model shopping and multiple subgroup analyses, and reliance on significance 
levels or p-values. 
5.1 Violation of model assumptions 
Relative risks from epidemiological studies often are derived from complex statistical 
models based on statistical assumptions that are not always clearly understood by non-
statisticians but which need to be met to reduce potential errors. The choice of a final model 
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in the model-building process is important because when the RR is small one cannot always 
verify whether the estimated risks are consistent with the graphic or tabular data. If 
statistical assumptions are not met the validity of the results is uncertain. We would like to 
be sure that an appropriate statistical model has been chosen and important assumptions 
have been met for applying the model to the data.  
There is a wide array of concerns relating to the final model choice. Among them is the form 
of the model including questions such as: 
 Is the risk assumed to be linear with exposure? 
 Does the model admit to or allow for a threshold or a ceiling? 
 Are confounders accounted for? 
Other important concerns include 
 Have the distributional assumptions of the model been met? For example, do counts 
follow a Poisson distribution, or are they better described by a negative binomial, or are 
the residuals normally distributed? 
 Are observations independent of each other? Are the residuals free of any auto-
correlation?  
 Has the appropriate model estimation technique been applied, such as least squares, 
GAM, GLM? 
5.2 Model shopping 
The widespread availability of statistical and computing technology is an important factor 
contributing to the potential for estimating RR with unrealistic precision. It is now easy to 
routinely engage in sophisticated optimizations across a large number of models and/or 
variables to identify associations of potential scientific interest. Even with a single risk factor 
and a single response, it has become standard practice to consider a potentially large number 
of models in an effort to adjust for differences among the exposed and the unexposed (Peng, et 
al., 2006). This phenomenon is often called ‘model-shopping.’   It is an underlying assumption 
that the significance level of an estimate is developed from a model that was specified before 
statistical analyses were performed. In practice, models often are modified in ways that violate 
this basic assumption of a completely pre-specified model in order to maximize model efficacy 
(or maximize the ability to produce a desired result). These violations include such acts as 
choosing different forms of background effects, selecting smoothing parameters, or choosing 
different lags for explanatory variables. Such ‘model shopping’ produces a spuriously inflated 
significance level, or narrowed confidence interval, that often overstates the significance of the 
predictors unless there is some adjustment. Hodges (1987) pointed out that reporting only the 
‘best’ model result and essentially ignoring the uncertainties associated with model 
assumptions may lead to overconfident predictions and policy decisions that are riskier and 
more uncertain than one thinks they are. 
The degree of overstating is related to the number of models tested. Chatfield commented   
“It is indeed strange that we [statisticians] often admit model uncertainty by searching for 
the best model but then ignore this uncertainty by making inferences and predictions as if 
certain that the best fitting model is actually true” (Chatfield 1995).  
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is one method that can help eliminate the concern of 
multiple models and provide more realistic estimates of uncertainty of relative risks (Clyde 
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2000). BMA works on the principal that it is possible to calculate the Bayes probability that a 
model is the correct model for a given data set. After considering all possible models one 
can estimate a common parameter of interest and its standard deviation and take into 
account multiple testing. The parameter of interest in many of our examples that follow is 
the risk associated with an increase in PM concentration. 
A cruder method to deal with problems of multiple model testing is to change the criteria 
for significance, as for example from p < 0.05 to p < 0.005. This method was suggested by the 
HEI Health Review Committee (2003) for revised analyses of ACS and Six Cities cohort 
studies (Krewski, Burnett et al. 2000).  
Neither of these methods (BMA or changing the level at which significance is declared) has 
been universally applied, so the concern remains about minimizing the reported error in a 
RR associated with multiple testing. Note Hill’s advice when interpreting for causality: 
don’t over-emphasize statistical significance tests, as systematic error is often greater than 
random error. He questions the usefulness of statistical significance in situations where 
differences are negligible. What could be worse than when the "glitter of the t table diverts 
attention from the inadequacies of the fare" (Hill 1965). 
5.3 Multiple subgroup analyses 
Closely related to the phenomenon of model shopping is the analysis of subgroups of the 
original sample. Subgroups are often formed by ‘interesting observations’ seen during the 
initial analyses and can be useful and lead to important discoveries. “Nearly everything that 
has been learned in epidemiology has been derived from the analysis of subgroups. This is 
an incisive, effective technique to which we owe our sustenance.” (Stallones, 1987). When 
subgroups are not selected a priori and are not part of the initial sample size determination, 
results from sub-group analyses must be looked on with caution and replications in a 
different experiment or sample are needed before any conclusions can be made. 
5.4 Over-reliance on significance levels 
It is a common misconception that the precision of a small RR depends on the significance 
level or p-value of an estimated RR. It is not true that the p-value or confidence interval “can 
provide a number that by itself reflects a probability of reaching erroneous conclusions.” 
(Goodman 1999a)    
The p-value is an informal index for measuring the difference between results of a study and 
the null hypothesis of no effect. A p-value of 0.05 does not mean that the null hypothesis has 
a probability of 5% of ‘being true’ (or that there is a 95% chance of no effect). This 
interpretation is incorrect because the study data alone cannot provide the probability that 
the null hypothesis is true. Tests based on probability (such as p-value and 95% confidence 
intervals) cannot provide “any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of a hypothesis” 
(Neyman and Pearson 1933; Goodman 1999a). The p-value only tells whether the results are 
statistically significant (Goodman 1999a). 
The strength of evidence for an effect estimate with a p-value of 0.05 is actually much 
weaker than the number 0.05 suggests. Goodman (Goodman 1999b) suggests using the 
Bayes Factor in lieu of the p-value. The Bayes Factor, related to the likelihood ratio, is an 
index for evaluating evidence outside of individual study results that can be used for 
assessing the likelihood that a relationship is true. The Bayes Factor compares the predictive 
value of the null and alternative hypotheses based on the weight of evidence. It can help 
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keep chance (statistical evidence) distinct from conclusions, while being part of a calculus 
that formally links them (Goodman 1999b).  
“We must expect that most truly new research findings in observational research will be 
unexpected and an unexpected result may well appear aberrant. To distinguish between 
those exceptional subgroups that have epidemiological significance and those that do not 
may be difficult. Statistical treatment is of little use in addressing the problem. A probability 
statement is of value in assessing the magnitude of an association in relation to the number 
of persons in the study; that is, it may help us restrain our enthusiasm over large difference 
in small groups. However, a p-value of 0.01 in an observational study does not mean that a 
difference as great or greater than the one observed will occur no more often than 1 in 100 
trials. By and large, statistical significance is a meaningless term in observational research. 
This is true for many reasons, but mainly because a p-value does not know any 
epidemiology; it was born into a world of tossing pennies and urns full of black and white 
balls, and it never read a book about disease. It can’t tell the difference between truth and 
bias, and it worships sample size more than truth” (Stallones, 1987). 
6. Discussion 
What should be done when an estimated RR is small, and consideration of epidemiological 
and statistical concepts do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether the 
estimated RR is too small to be accurately estimated?   Two possible approaches are 
discussed in this section. The first is a technical solution that involves gathering more data 
and testing the statistical model; the second is a more philosophical approach. They are not 
mutually exclusive ways to approach this difficulty, and they are not always practical or 
satisfactory.  
6.1 A Direct method 
A direct method to demonstrate that a RR has been accurately estimated is to demonstrate 
that the same risk is seen in a similar, but disjoint, population using the same model used to 
develop the initial estimate. A statistical model developed to estimate an RR can be thought 
of as a descriptive model because it describes the data at hand. It was crafted to be ‘the best’ 
at estimating the RR, and by extension for describing the data set. However, when a 
descriptive model is going to be used to predict future effects that will accrue because of a 
change in exposure, thinking and application of the model must also change. Chatfield 
(1995) noted, “…model builders should adopt a more pragmatic approach in which they 
search not for a true model, but rather a parsimonious model giving an adequate 
approximation to the data at hand and then concentrate on determining the model’s accuracy 
and usefulness, rather than testing it [for significance].” 
For example, a descriptive time-series regression model in a mortality study of air-pollution 
can be used to describe relationships in a specific city for the previous 10 years say. For 
prediction of pollution effects, use the same model with the same coefficients to predict one 
year (or more) into the future. Then determine the accuracy and precision of the predicted 
measurements. A kind of sensitivity analysis could be done by developing two time-series 
models on the past data: one with an air pollution term in the model and one without the air 
pollution term. Then see if either can accurately predict the future data, and if the model 
with the air pollution term has a better fit to the “new data.” 
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This type of validation would be a major demonstration that the estimated risk was useful 
both as a descriptor and a predictor. 
However, in many situations this method is not feasible. In a cohort study all the ‘cases’ 
have usually been identified and there are no more cases to use in the second, confirmatory, 
study. Or the study population may be too small to divide it for both descriptive and 
predictive purposes. A similar problem occurs with case-control studies. In air pollution 
time-series studies there are technical difficulties that preclude using the exact coefficients 
from past data in a new data set, although there is some hope that this problem can be 
overcome. In the time-series example, it is not sufficient to develop a model in a different 
location and show the form of the model is the same. This procedure only demonstrates that 
the model is descriptive for another data set; the goal is to show the model is predictive 
because it may be used to set policy for future exposures. 
6.2 Trans-science 
Weinberg (1972) coined the term trans-science to describe the realm of scientific questions 
of facts that are properly formulated, but cannot be answered by science. The answers 
transcend science, usually because of the impracticality of expending the required time 
and money. Such questions include the shape of an exposure response curve at very low 
levels of exposure, or probabilities of extremely improbable events such as failures in 
complex systems like nuclear reactors and dams. His point is that we will never know, 
with a reasonable expenditure of resources, what the precise risks are at low (often 
environmental) levels. He discusses the Science Republic (the realm of scientists), and the 
Political Republic (the realm of politicians).These two are joined in the Republic of Trans-
Science, the character of which depends on place and time. A major difficulty is to draw 
the line between matters of science and matters of trans-science, and is a crucially 
important role of the scientist. This is a difficult task, but often it is beneficial to draw the 
line and declare a question to be in the realm of trans-science. Then it can be dealt with on 
moral or aesthetic grounds, rather than having a scientific debate that has no hope of 
resolution. He concludes with the upbeat idea that the most science can do is to inject 
some intellectual discipline into the Republic of Trans-science and hope that politics in an 
open society will keep it democratic.  
In a paper that deals with a topic similar to the current one about estimating minimum risk, 
Weinberg (1985) proposes a method for dealing with trans-science questions that are 
concerned with setting limits on an exposure response curve. He calls the trans-science 
problem of setting an environmental standard based on incomplete information ‘The 
Regulator’s Dilemma’ and suggests initiating a branch of science called Regulatory Science. 
In this new branch of science the norms of scientific proof would be less demanding than in 
standard science. Instead of asking science for answers to questions that are unanswerable, 
the regulators should be content with less far-reaching and seemingly less precise answers. 
He suggests that where ranges of uncertainty can be well established, then regulations can 
be based on the uncertainty. Where the ranges of uncertainty are so wide as to be 
meaningless, then ask the question so that the regulation does not depend on answers to an 
unanswerable question. 
Weinberg (1985) provides an idea on how to provide some assurance of public safety 
despite uncertainty in the estimation of the risk. The idea, called de minimis, is to set the 
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permissible exposure level at some fraction above the natural background level irrespective 
of the possible risk. The idea is that for almost all environmental hazards, or putative 
hazards, there is a natural background level, such as for cosmic radiation or exposure to the 
suite of pollutants regulated by the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. A de minimis 
standard would be at some level above background level, for example 1.0 or 1.5 standard 
deviations above the mean. The idea is that man has lived with the natural exposure, and if 
it was harmful man would not have survived. So, an increase that is small relative to natural 
background should be acceptable.  
7. Conclusion 
Theoretically, there is no relative risk that is too small to be estimated. The relative risk is 
a construct or a concept, not a physical reality. Since it is a mathematically defined 
concept it can be mathematically estimated to any degree of precision. However, we 
have shown in this paper that (1) there are many assumptions that must be met to make 
certain that the RR estimate is accurate and precise; and (2) the significance level or 
uncertainty associated with the RR estimate has its own set of assumptions that must be 
met. So, while there may be no theoretical minimum RR that can be estimated, in practice 
there is a minimum risk and varies depending on uncertainties present in the context of 
each study.  
An analogy in the physical world of estimating a RR is to measure the length of an object. A 
meterstick is precise enough to determine the width of a table to see if it will fit through a 
doorway, but a meterstick is not precise enough to measure the diameter of a shaft in an 
automobile engine with a tolerance of ±1.0 mm. To measure the shaft diameter one would 
use a micrometer. The micrometer while sufficiently precise to measure the shaft is not 
adequate to determine the size of a dust mite, usually in the range of 200 to 300 µm. The 
analogy can be carried through to the size of molecules, to the wavelength of visible light, 
and to the diameter of an electron. The conclusion is that while all the tasks involve 
measuring length and there is no practical ‘minimum length’, different tools and 
considerations are needed depending on the object to be measured and the precision 
required.  
The analogy carries over to the estimation of a RR. There is less concern about detailed 
assumptions when estimating a RR of lung cancer among pack-a-day smokers with 
estimated RRs ranging from 10 to 25. But there is greater concern about meeting detailed 
assumptions when estimating the RR of mortality from a 10 µg/m3 increase in PM air 
pollution where RRs may be as low as 1.004 (or 3 to 4 orders of magnitude smaller than that 
of lung cancer and smoking), and concluding the association is causal.  
What is to be done when an estimated RR is small and in the controversial range?   Two 
suggestions were provided: (1) verify the estimated risk with new data; and (2) regulate on 
exposure not on the response as done in the regulatory arena when the consequences of 
exposure are controversial. In many cases neither of these solutions will be considered 
acceptable, putting us back into the realm of uncertainty. 
Epidemiology has provided society with many benefits by providing clues to the causes of 
infectious diseases and identifying factors that contribute to the start and development of 
non-communicable diseases (Wynder, 1987). Causal knowledge allows quick and effective 
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preventive measures to lessen or halt diseases without a full understanding of the 
underlying mechanism. Some examples of interventions fruitfully undertaken without a full 
understanding of mechanisms include tobacco-related diseases, radiation and leukemia, and 
UV light and skin cancer. In these cases RRs were quite high, with magnitudes exceeding 10 
-fold increases at reasonably low exposures.  
However, when it comes to weaker associations, errors in the estimation of the risk can 
produce a false positive association when in fact no association exists, and vice-versa 
(Wynder, 1987). Epidemiological data may have the required quality to address a research 
hypothesis and estimate risk if thought, planning and care are taken in the design of the 
study with consideration of how cases and controls are selected or the cohort is defined, 
when possible biases and confounders have been avoided or properly considered, when 
problems of subgroup analysis are clearly understood, and when the protocol is carefully 
and accurately carried out. It is likely a correct interpretation may be possible if all available 
evidence is subjected to a careful review of the biological plausibility of the initial 
hypothesis, if the criteria discussed above are implemented, and if the data analyses are 
correctly carried out without pre-conceived bias. There are times, however, that such care is 
not given to epidemiological studies and their interpretations. There is a great concern that 
in the "rush to publish," often as a preliminary report, false associations are reported which 
do not do justice to the factor being incriminated as harmful, nor to public safety if a risk in 
fact does not exist, nor to the science of epidemiology.  
Most of the problems in epidemiology, as they relate to reliable and interpretable 
estimations of small RRs, can be avoided if researchers pay attention and carefully consider  
issues relating to study design, confounding, the many forms of bias, reliability, 
measurement error and misclassification, multiple agents, sampling error, violation of 
model assumptions, model shopping, multiple subgroup analyses, and over-reliance on 
significance levels or p-values. 
We agree with Wynder (1987) that epidemiology is able to correctly interpret relatively 
small relative risks, but only if the best epidemiological methodology is applied and only if 
the data are fully evaluated by examining all judgment criteria, especially those of biological 
plausibility. As RRs become smaller, the need for close adherence to these basic principles 
becomes greater. If these ideas are applied, a conclusion of no risk should reassure society. 
And when a risk is reported as positive, appropriate preventive measures to reduce 
avoidable illness can be used to successfully reach the ultimate goal of epidemiology and 
preventive medicine.  
8. Appendix 
8.1 Quotes from knowledgeable researchers in the field 
There are many references from experienced health scientists as to what a reasonable 
minimum relative risk should be. Gary Taubes (1995) in his 1995 Science article had 
collected a number of quotes, not all of which could be independently verified. The 
following is a collection of some of Taubes’ quotes and other comments from various 
sources, presented in almost alphabetical order. 
“As a general rule of thumb, we are looking for a relative risk of 3 or more before accepting 
a paper for publication.” 
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Marcia Angell, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, reported in Taubes 1995. 
”If it's a 1.5 relative risk and it's only one study and even a very good one, you scratch your 
chin and say maybe.” 
John Bailar, reported in Taubes 1995 
“Relative risks of less than 2.0 may readily reflect some unperceived bias or confounding 
factor, those over 5.0 are unlikely to do so.” 
Breslow and Day, 1980, Statistical methods in cancer research, Vol. 1, The analysis of case 
control studies. Published by the World Health Organization, International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, Sci. Pub. No. 32, Lyon, p. 36. 
“Epidemiological studies, in general are probably not able, realistically, to identify with any 
confidence any relative risks lower than 1.3 (that is a 30% increase in risk) in that context, the 
1.5 [reported relative risk of developing breast cancer after abortion] is a modest elevation 
compared to some other risk factors that we know cause disease.”  
Dr. Eugenia Calle, Director of Analytic Epidemiology, American Cancer Society, 
Washington Post - Oct 27,1994 
“ ... when relative risk lies between 1 and 2 ... problems of interpretation may become acute, 
and it may be extremely difficult to disentangle the various contributions of biased 
information, confounding of two or more factors, and cause and effect.” 
Richard Doll, F.R.S. and Richard Peto “The Causes of Cancer,"   Oxford-New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 1219. 
“An association is generally considered weak if the odds ratio [relative risk] is under 3.0 and 
particularly when it is under 2.0, as is the case in the relationship of ETS and lung cancer.” 
Dr. Geoffrey Kabat, Senior Epidemiologist, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, from 
E.L. Wynder & G.C. Kabat, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer: A Critical 
Assessment, I.SAB.7.1 at 6 (JA 7,216), 
http://www.forces.org/evidence/epafraud/files/osteen.htm, accessed 26 Dec 2007 
“In epidemiologic research, [increases in risk of less than 100 percent] are considered small 
and are usually difficult to interpret. Such increases may be due to chance, statistical bias, or 
the effects of confounding factors that are sometimes not evident.”  “It is not size of the RR 
alone (but we have to agree at some point low is too low say 1.03 relative risk) but the 
results of other studies addressing the same issue and concerns about biological plausibility 
have to be factored in. Even though the size of the RR or OR is not necessarily determinative 
it is easy to cite a number of experts in the field who favor the notion that RR less than 2 
should be- if not dismissed- at least looked at with a very skeptical eye.” 
National Cancer Institute, "Abortion and Possible Risk for Breast Cancer: Analysis and 
Inconsistencies," October 26, 1994 press release 
“Differences in risk of 50% (Relative risk of 1.5) are small in epidemiological terms and 
severely challenge our ability to distinguish whether it reflects cause and effects or whether 
it simply reflects bias.” 
Lynn Rosenberg, Boston University School of Medicine quoted in Press Release U.S. 
National Cancer Institute Oct 26,1994 
“Any scientist worth his qualifications knows that a RR of less than two or even three is 
unreliable and too shaky to place much reliance upon.” 
John K. Sutherland quoted from “The Week That Was”, April 22, 2006,  
”My basic rule is if the relative risk isn't at least 3 or 4, forget it.”  
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Robert Temple, director of drug evaluation at the Food and Drug Administration, 
reported in Taubes 1995 
”With epidemiology you can tell a little thing from a big thing. What's very hard to do is to 
tell a little thing from nothing at all.” 
Michael Thun, VP of Epidemiology and Surveillance Research at the American Cancer 
society reported in Taubes 1995 
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